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SYNOPSIS
Because “priorities” are such an important and difficult issue in Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), most commentators use what
might be called an individualized or seriatim approach to priorities. For
example, most commentators start by describing the rules of priorities for
individual kinds of properties or for individual kinds of transactions. Then the
commentators move on to second kinds of properties or transactions and
describe the priorities for them, and then to a third, etc. However, because the
priority rules are so difficult, the individualized or seriatim approach to
discussions of priorities often generates confusion or a lack of full
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understanding. The analysis of priorities here differs. This analysis suggests
that there is a hierarchy of priorities in Article 9 of the UCC and that this
hierarchy is relatively simple to describe. The analysis here describes this
hierarchy by engaging in a two-part analysis. Part I suggests that the rules for
priorities in Article 9 come out of the interaction of a number of variables,
variables that are well-known to everybody who is familiar with Article 9.1
Part II suggests that the variables described in Part I allow us to put all of the
important rules about priorities into a simple chart that shows how the various
different priorities interact with each other.2
INTRODUCTION
Everyone who is familiar with the practice of law in connection with
Article 9 of the UCC3 knows that in many cases non-paying debtors have
enough money to pay some but not all of their debts. In these very common
cases, lines of creditors form to recover from the debtors. Creditors at or near
the front will likely collect at least something from the debtors. Creditors at or
near the end, however, will not collect at all, or will collect only pennies on the
dollar. Thus, when creditors line up to collect from non-paying debtors,
creditors always try to position themselves as far forward in the lines of
creditors as possible.
Generally speaking, commercial law uses a system of priorities to
determine where individual creditors get to stand in the line of creditors.4
Creditors with high priorities get to stand at or near the front. Creditors with
low priorities have to stand at or near the end. Article 9 of the UCC provides
most of the rules about priorities; however, the United States Bankruptcy Code
(“Bankruptcy Code”) adds some important ideas as well.
Most books and commentators on Article 9 priorities use what might be
called an “individualized” or “seriatim” approach to priorities. For example,
most commentators start by describing the rules of priorities for individual
kinds of property or for individual kinds of transactions.
Then the
commentators move on to second kinds of property or transactions and
describe their respective priorities, and then to a third, etc. However, because
the priority rules are so difficult, the individualized or seriatim approach to
discussions of priorities often generates confusion or a lack of full


1

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
3
U.C.C. § 9 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
4
JAMES J. WHITE, ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, WHITE AND SUMMERS’
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1227 (6th ed. 2015).
2
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understanding. Hardly any commentators, it seems, attempt to show how
different priority ideas fit together with each other, or where different kinds of
priorities have related but different impacts on individual debtors or creditors.5
For example, discussions of priorities rarely (if ever) show how creditors with
attached but not perfected security interests stand in relation to other kinds of
creditors. Likewise, discussions of priorities rarely (if ever) show how various
liens—like statutory, tax, bankruptcy, or judicial liens—fit into an overall
scheme of priority, or fit together with Article 9 security interests. Rather,
most discussions of priorities simply state what the priority is for certain kinds
of claims and leave it at that. No overall scheme is described.
The analysis here addresses this problem by suggesting that there is an
overall hierarchy of priorities articulated in Article 9 of the UCC. A simple
chart, reproduced at the end of this analysis, depicts this hierarchy.6 The higher
that individual creditors are in terms of this overall hierarchy (i.e., the higher
that individual creditors are on this chart), the farther forward these creditors
stand in lines of creditors who are trying to collect from non-paying debtors.
On the chart there are several different “layers” or “tiers.” Priority claims in
the various tiers or layers are mostly treated the same.
A quick introductory point must immediately be made. The ideas
discussed in Part I of the analysis here are extremely familiar and known to
anybody who works with Article 9.7 Therefore, the analysis here moves over
these ideas very quickly and provides few reference citations. The point of the
analysis is not to repeat ideas that everybody already knows. Rather, the point
of the analysis is to organize these ideas in a way that has not yet been done.
So, the organization of the ideas, rather than the ideas themselves, are the key
to understanding here.
Before we get to the different kinds of claims to property and the
claimants who will go in various layers or tiers of priority, we must start with a
couple of basic priority points. These ideas cut across all aspects of priority.
First, generally speaking, secured creditors or lien creditors would stand
ahead of unsecured or non-lien creditors in a line of creditors, at least in terms
of individual items of property of debtors.8 Thus, for example, if C1 has an
unsecured claim against D dated January 1 and C2 has a secured claim against
D dated May 1, C2 will likely be farther forward in the line of creditors than
C1 because C2 is a secured creditor and C1 is an unsecured creditor. So,


5

An exception here is Douglas Whaley.
See infra tbl. 1.
7
See infra Part I.
8
See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-322(a)(1) (AM. INST. LAW & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
6
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generally speaking, secured or lien creditors are much more likely to get paid
than non-secured, non-lien creditors.
Second, earlier in time liens or interest creditors stand ahead of later in
time liens or interest creditors, subject to some very important exceptions (the
most important of which is the Purchase Money Interest (PMI) exception).9
So, for example, if C1 has a secured claim against D dated January 1 and C2
has a secured claim against D dated May 1, C1 likely will be farther forward in
the line of creditors lined up against D than C2. However, an important
exception might apply if C2 is a PMI creditor and C1 is not such a creditor.
Third, if debtors declare bankruptcy, a trustee (representative) for the
debtor will be appointed and instructed to act on behalf of the general creditors
collectively. So, if D declares bankruptcy, a trustee for D will be appointed
and that trustee will then represent all of the general or unsecured creditors of
D, for example, C1, C2, and C3. In addition, the Bankruptcy Code states that
this bankruptcy trustee will have the status of a lien creditor against the
bankrupt debtor.10 Thus, and again by way of example, though C1, C2, and C3
(unsecured creditors) individually may be near the end of the line of creditors
trying to collect from D, B (the bankruptcy trustee for D who represents C1,
C2, and C3) will get to move forward in the line of creditors against D and
stand with the other lien creditors against D.
I. DIFFERENT KINDS OF CLAIMS TO PROPERTY AND THE PRIORITY OF THE
DIFFERENT KINDS OF CLAIMS
As we will see, it is possible to put together a list of seven different kinds
of claimants (or different kinds of interests) to particular property of debtors.
Claimants early on this list, and at the bottom of our chart of hierarchy, have
low priority in the property.11 If debtors have limited amounts of property,
these low-priority claimants will usually get little or nothing. Conversely,
claimants late on this list who are high on the chart of priority will likely
recover at least something. Claimants who are in individual tiers or layers in
this hierarchy of priorities usually will fight it out amongst themselves using
the earlier-in-time or earlier-in-line general rule.
A. Wrongful Possessors of Property
We start with a very quick reference to one of the most important rules of


9

See id. § 9-322.
11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2012).
11
See infra Part II.
10
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property law, the rule of nemo dat, also referred to as nemo dat quod non
habet.12 No one (nemo) gives (dat) what (quod) he or she doesn’t have (non
habet). The heart of the idea is that transferors of property (of any kind) can
only give to their transferees what the transferors themselves had. Thus, if
transferors of property have no title or rights in the property, then those
transferors cannot give title or rights in that property to their transferees. The
same thing occurs with defective title or defective rights. If transferors have
defective title or rights in property, then the transferors can only give to
transferees that defective title or those defective rights.
There’s good news and bad news about nemo dat. The good news is that
this rule provides lots of protection to original owners of property or original
claimants against property. This is so for a simple reason. If thieves or
fraudsters wrongfully take property from the original owners of that property,
the thieves or fraudsters have no rights, or defective rights in the property.
Thus, if the thieves or fraudsters transfer that property to third parties, the third
parties get only what the transferors had, which is little or nothing. Thus,
following these kinds of transfers, the original owners can get the property
back from the transferees. The bad news is that some transferees of property
will have no rights in that property at all. This is so even if these transferees
themselves are perfectly innocent possessors of the property and completely
unaware of the wrongful things that have happened to the property in the past.
In terms of liens and security interests, the foregoing means that some
transferees of property will take property subject to any and all liens and
security interests against it. This is so even if these transferees thought that
they were getting clean ownership of the property and were totally innocent.
We’ll just call these transferees wrongful possessors of the property, albeit
sometimes innocent wrongful possessors.
Note quickly that we will see later that some transferees of property will
qualify to be “rightful possessors” of property. Several different kinds of
rightful possessors exist, including, most importantly, “good faith possessors”
of goods. Because it is quite easy to qualify to be a rightful possessor—it’s
even easy to qualify to be a rightful possessor who fits into the “good faith


12

U.C.C. § 1-201(29)–(30) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001); Id. §§ 9-201(a),
9-203(b)(2) (2010); see also Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Using First Principles of
UCC Article 9 to Solve Statutory Puzzles in Receivables Financing, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 297
(2010/2011); Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., U.C.C. Article 9, Filing-Based
Authority, and Fundamental Property Principles: A Reply to Professor Plank, 69 BUS. LAW. 79
(2013); WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND PAYMENT
SYSTEMS (2009); WHITE ET AL., supra note 4, at 199–200; The Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet Rule,
LAW TEACHER, http://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/commercial-law/the-nemo-dat-quodnon-habet-rule-commercial-law-essay.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
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possessor” subcategory—rightful possessors of property are likely to be much
more common in the real world than wrongful possessors.
A. General Creditors
Some credit sellers and credit lenders provide credit sales or loans on an
“open account” or “unsecured” or “non-lien” basis, while other creditors do not
seek to get non-consensual liens against the property of their debtors at all.
These creditors, often called general creditors, do not have either consensual
security interests or non-consensual liens against the property of their debtors.
The best examples of unsecured or open account or non-lien creditors are Visa
and MasterCard.
General (i.e., unsecured) creditors have claims against the persons of
debtors, because the debtors either have agreed to make payments to the
creditors or otherwise have rights against the persons of the debtors.
Importantly, however, unsecured (i.e., non-lien, open account creditors), do not
have claims against any individual property of their debtors. Rather, and to
repeat, the claims of these creditors are against the persons of the debtors. To
be sure, general creditors may be able to get judgments against their debtors
and then turn those judgments into claims against the property of the debtors
with the use of judicial liens, which we’ll come to in a moment. But, at least
initially, general (unsecured) creditors only have claims against the persons of
debtors.
And now a quick reminder about what happens in cases where debtors
declare bankruptcy. First, as noted before, under the Bankruptcy Code, the
bankruptcy trustee (or other representative) of the debtor represents the
interests of all the general creditors. So, if a debtor declares bankruptcy, all of
the debtor’s general creditors will be represented by the debtor’s bankruptcy
trustee. Second, the Bankruptcy Code says that the trustee (or other
representative) of the bankrupt debtor has the status of a lien creditor of the
debtor.13 The widely used terminology in this context is that the trustee (or
other representative) of the debtor has a bankruptcy lien against the property of
the debtor. This means that debtors’ general creditors on an individual basis
stand near the end of lines of creditors. But, collectively, the general creditors
may be represented by a bankruptcy trustee who gets to stand farther forward
in the lines of creditors.14


13

11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2012).
Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code contains rules that determine priorities among general
creditors. Thus, for example, the Bankruptcy Code says that family law debts, alimony, child
support, etc., have the highest priority among general creditors. Id. § 507(a)(1). Expenses related
14
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It should not be underestimated how many creditors of particular debtors
will be unsecured, i.e., general creditors. So, candidly, there will be lots of
people and businesses standing in this part of lines of creditors (although, as
we’ll see soon, these people and businesses in some cases will have a
representative standing ahead of them in the line).
One further point must be made about unsecured creditors. Since Article
9 puts all unsecured creditors in the same layer or tier of the hierarchy of
priority, unsecured creditors usually beat each other based on the time debts
were incurred. Thus, earlier in time usually beats later in time.15 Note,
however, that this applies only to claims in this layer or tier. As we’ll see, later
in time claims in higher layers or tiers may beat earlier in time claims in this
unsecured claimants layer or tier.
B. “Step 1” Secured Creditors—Attached but not Perfected Interests
Those familiar with practice under Article 9 of the UCC know that
generally speaking (and leaving aside deemed or operation of law security
interests16), consensual security interests come into existence and provide full
protection to creditors as the result of a two-step process. The first step
involves “attachment.” The second step involves “perfection.”
For the moment, we will focus on Step 1 of the two-step process, the
attachment step, because we are only interested in what might be called Step 1
security interests. Later, we’ll come back to Step 2 of the two-step process and
talk about perfection of security interests, after which we’ll talk about Step 2
security interests.
Attachment, the first step in the usual two-step process for security
interests, converts claims against the persons of owners of the property into
claims against the property itself.17 Usually, the attachment stage requires


to bankruptcies themselves are second and third on the list of priorities among general creditors.
Id. § 507(a)(2)–(3). Employee wages are in the number four slot among general creditors and
unpaid contributions to employee benefit plans go fifth. Id. § 507(a)(4)–(5). The list goes on and
on. However, other than these bankruptcy priorities for general creditors, general creditors usually
share among each other on a pro rata basis. See, e.g., id. § 726(b) (2012); JUDGE JUDITH K.
FITZGERALD, JUDGE ARTHUR J. GONZALEZ & JUDGE MARY F. WALRATH, BANKRUPTCY ¶ 17:1720
(Rutter Group, Nat. Ed. 2015). Often these priorities (and this pro rata rule) among general
creditors mean nothing because in many bankruptcy cases, all of the debtors’ money is gone by the
time the general creditors get to the front of the line of creditors.
15
U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012).
16
However, with deemed security interests and agricultural liens (which are treated for most
purposes like security interests), the interests come into existence by operation of law rather than
by attachment. See id. § 9-310.
17
Id. § 9-203.
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satisfaction of three elements: (1) a security agreement and a record of the
agreement; (2) payment of value; and (3) rights by the debtor in the collateral.
The need for these three elements indicates that in most cases commercial
actors who wish to have fully effective security interests must take some
affirmative steps to bring about attachment. Further, the necessary elements
for attachment indicate that, in virtually all cases, creditors who have attached
security interests know that these interests exist.
Because attached security interests are claims against particular property
of debtors, attached claims to particular property have priority over general
claims against debtors who own or possess that property. This is because, to
repeat, general claims are only claims against the persons of the debtors—not
claims against particular property of the debtors.
Note now an extremely important point: It is indeed a good thing to have
an attached security interest. That’s because attached security interests against
particular property will generally beat general claims against the owners of the
property. But, attached security interests do not provide full protection because
security interests in property become fully effective—and provide full
protection to creditors—only if the interests have also gone through Step 2:
Perfection.
As a practical matter, perfection usually follows attachment as a matter
of course because most creditors—or certainly their lawyers—know that
attached interests do not fully protect creditors. Further, in a significant
number of cases— for example, those involving consumer goods—attached
interests perfect automatically. In these cases, the creditors need not do
anything at all to perfect their interests. Given the foregoing, attached but not
perfected interests are relatively rare. However, sometimes creditors forget to
perfect, or excessively delay in perfecting, already attached interests. Further,
in cases involving deemed security interests, the creditors probably won’t even
know that they have security interests that need to be perfected. So, failure to
perfect already attached security interests does occur.
Given all of the foregoing, a couple of things are clear. First, as noted
earlier, Step 1 consensual interests—attached but not perfected—beat general
claimants because attached interests are claims against property of debtors
whereas general claims are claims only against the persons of debtors.18
Second, Step 1 security interests should be lower in the priority scheme than
Step 2 consensual interests, because Step 1 interests are not fully effective
whereas Step 2 interests are fully effective.19 Third, since Article 9 puts all


18
19



Id. § 9-322(a)(3).
Id. § 9-322(a)(2).
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Step 1 security interests in the same layer or tier of the priority hierarchy, Step
1 security interests compete against each other by time obtained. Earlier in
time (among Step 1 interests) usually is earlier in line.20
Finally, here are a couple of crucially important ideas. First, it is rare to
see a Step 1 consensual lien holder attached but not perfected in court, because
as soon as litigation threatens, Step 1 consensual lien holders take steps to
perfect their liens. Hence, by the time litigation actually happens, the Step 1
consensual lien holders usually are Step 2 consensual lien holders. Second,
Step 1 consensual lien holders have lower priority than Step 2 consensual lien
holders.21 Third, buyers of property that are subject to Step 1 consensual
interests (i.e., attached but not perfected interests), have priority in the property
over the interest attached but not perfected creditors. Finally, as we’ll see next,
Step 1 consensual liens (attached but not perfected) are usually lower in
priority than non-consensual liens (statutory, tax, judicial and bankruptcy
liens).22
C. Non-Consensual Lien (P-STJB Lien) Creditors
Anyone who has studied or read about Article 9 security interests and
various kinds of liens—the most important kinds of liens being statutory,
judicial, bankruptcy, and tax liens—knows that the terminology used in
connection with discussions of security interests and liens can be quite
confusing. In fact, the terminology used in that context sometimes is flat out
contradictory.
That being said, we need to start with some basic definitions, beginning
with “lien” and “security interests.” The most concise definitions for these
terms can be found in section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code. A “lien” is defined
as a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or
performance of an obligation.”23 The term “security interests” is defined as a
“lien created by an agreement.”24
These definitions make it clear that at least in bankruptcy proceedings—
where a very large percentage of secured transactions problems work
themselves out—the term “lien” includes all of the different kinds of property
interests described herein. Those interests in property are (1) Article 9


20

Id. § 9-322(a)(3).
Id. § 9-322(a)(2).
22
Id. § 9-333.
23
11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (2012).
24
Id. § 101(51).
21
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“security interests,”25 which in almost all cases are “consensual security
interests”26; (2) “deemed security interests,” which are created by operation of
law;27 (3) “agricultural liens,”28 which are created by statute but for most
important purposes are treated like Article 9 security interests;29 and (4) nonconsensual liens (especially possessory-statutory, tax, judicial, and bankruptcy
liens).
The terminology problem stems from the fact that Article 9 has different
definitions for these same terms. For example, the Bankruptcy Code provides
the following definition of “lien creditor”:
(52) “Lien creditor” means:
(A) a creditor that has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment,
levy, or the like;
(B) an assignee for benefit of creditors from the time of assignment;
(C) a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition; or
30

(D) a receiver in equity from the time of appointment.

This Article 9 definition of “lien creditor” clearly excludes possessors of
Article 9 security interests, including “deemed” security interests. Rather, this
Article 9 definition indicates that lien creditors are solely non-consensual
creditors, such as those who have statutory, tax, bankruptcy, and judicial
liens.31 Further, the UCC’s definition of “security interests”32 strongly


25

U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001).
See U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
27
Paul Wangerin, Deemed Security Interests: A Trap for the Unwary (2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). Deemed security interests come into existence in connection
with some lease transactions, some consignments, some “tolling” arrangements, and some transfers
of payment rights. Id.
28
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(5) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
29
Agricultural liens do not come into existence through the normal “attachment” process;
rather, agricultural liens “become effective” by operation of law. See id. §§ 9-308(b), 9-308 cmt. 2.
30
Id. § 9-102(a)(52).
31
See id. Interestingly, this Article 9 definition of “lien creditor” also excludes possessors of
what Article 9 itself calls agricultural liens. See id.; see also id. § 9-102(a)(5). This exclusion
occurs because Article 9 says that, at least for perfection purposes, agricultural liens are treated like
Article 9 security interests. See id. § 9-308.
32
U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001).
“Security interest” means an interest in personal property or fixtures which
secures payment or performance of an obligation. “Security interest”
includes any interest of a consignor and a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, a
payment intangible, or a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to
26
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suggests that security interests in the UCC are not “liens” as the Bankruptcy
Code defines liens. Likewise, UCC sections 9-109, 9-317, 9-322, and 9-333
suggest the same thing.33 In the UCC, security interests, either consensual or
deemed security interests, are—well—security interests. They are not liens.
Note here that Article 9 differentiates between “possessory” statutory
liens—where a creditor with a statutory lien has possession of the property—
and “non-possessory” statutory liens—where the creditor does not have
possession of the property. Article 9 concerns itself only with possessorystatutory (“P-S”) liens.34 Non-possessory statutory liens are covered by nonUCC law.35
Which brings us to the definitions we need. Because we will mostly be
talking about Article 9 issues in this analysis, we’ll use the Article 9
terminology herein (even though we’ll frequently be talking about bankruptcy
cases). Thus, the term “lien” will be used herein only to describe nonconsensual liens against property interests such as possessory-statutory, tax,
judicial, and bankruptcy liens (“P-STJB”) liens. The term “lien” also will from
time to time herein be used to describe agricultural liens.36 This is so even
though agricultural liens are treated for many purposes as if they are security
interests. On the other hand, the analysis here will use the term “security
interest” only to describe consensual security interests in property and “deemed
security interests” in property. Said in reverse, consensual interests in property
herein and deemed security interests in property will exclusively be called
security interests.
A brief word must now be said about priority and non-consensual liens.


Article 9. “Security interest” does not include the special property interest
of a buyer of goods on identification of those goods to a contract for sale
under . . . Section 2-505, the right of a seller or lessor of goods under Article
2 or 2A to retain or acquire possession of the goods is not a “security
interest” but a seller or lessor may also acquire a “security interest” by
complying with Article 9. The retention or reservation of title by a seller of
goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer under Section 2401 is limited in effect to a reservation of a “security interest.” Whether a
transaction in the form of a lease creates a ‘security interest’ is determined
pursuant to Section 1-203.
Id.
33
Compare U.C.C. §§ 9-109, 9-317, 9-322, 9-333 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2010), with 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (2012).
34
See U.C.C. § 9-333 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
35
Id. § 9-109(c)–(d). However, in some cases, non-UCC statutes about statutory liens
sometimes explicitly state that the statutory liens will have priority over other kinds of interests and
liens. The UCC respects these explicit statements about the priority of statutory liens. Id. § 9333(b).
36
See id. § 9-109(a)(2).
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These liens, which include statutory, tax, judicial and bankruptcy liens,
(hereinafter “P-STJB liens”) are imposed on debtors by statutes or by court
orders. P-STJB liens are NOT consensual. Note, however, that agricultural
liens, which are created by statutes, are for the most part treated as if they are
security interests. So, to the extent that agricultural liens are mentioned herein,
they will be discussed alongside security interests.
Statutory liens – other than agricultural liens (which are created by
statute but treated as if they are security interests) – usually protect providers of
services to owners of property of non-consensual creditors of the owners of
property. Thus, for example, if P, a plumber, provides services to H’s home,
and if H then doesn’t pay for the services, P can complete paperwork that will
give P an interest in H’s home. Thereafter, if necessary, P can use judicial
proceedings to sell H’s home and use the proceeds of the sale to pay down H’s
debt to P. Statutory liens come in an almost infinite variety, all the way from
liens such as the plumber’s lien, just described, through liens that highly skilled
professionals can impose on clients’ property, lawyers liens, for example, and
architects’ liens.
Tax liens are liens against property that government taxing authorities
can impose on the property of taxpayers if the taxpayers haven’t paid their
taxes.37 After tax liens are imposed on property, the taxing authorities can, if
necessary, take the property away from the taxpayers, sell it, and use the
proceeds of the sales to pay down the tax debts.
After people or businesses declare bankruptcy, the bankruptcy system
appoints trustees or representatives for the bankrupt debtors.
These
representatives thereafter act on behalf of the bankrupt debtors’ general
creditors. As was originally stated in Section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act,
bankruptcy trustees have the status of lien creditors.38 Unofficially, however,
lawyers and judges in these cases usually say that bankruptcy trustees have
“bankruptcy liens” against the property of debtors. Once the trustees get these


37

26 U.S.C. §§ 6321–6323 (2012).
Per Section 70(c):
The trustee, as to all property, whether or not coming into possession or
control of the court, upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could have
obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings at the date of bankruptcy,
shall be deemed vested as of such date with all the rights, remedies, and
powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon by such proceedings,
whether or not such a creditor actually exists.
The Hypothetical Creditor and the Trustee in Bankruptcy under Section 70C—Constance v.
Harvey Rejected, 2 B.C.L. REV. 372, 372 n.5 (1961), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol2/
iss2/17. Note that U.C.C. section 9-102(a)(52) also states that bankruptcy trustees have the status
of lien creditors.
38
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bankruptcy liens, the trustees can take the covered property away from the
debtors, sell it, and use the proceeds of the sales to pay off as much as possible
of the debtors’ debts to general creditors. Thus, though general creditors
individually stand very near the back of the line of creditors than line up
against debtors, the general creditors collectively get to stand farther forward in
the lines of creditors. That’s because lien creditors, including the bankruptcy
trustee, generally go ahead in lines of creditors than general creditors.
Finally, if people or businesses obtain judgments against others that
involve money owed by the judgment defendants, and if the judgment
defendants don’t pay those judgments, the judgment plaintiffs can take
additional steps to obtain “judicial” or “judgment” liens against the judgment
defendants’ property.39 Then, if the judgment defendants still don’t pay the
judgments, the judgment plaintiffs can (with court assistance) take the lienedagainst property away from the judgment defendants, sell it, and use the
proceeds of the sales to pay down the judgments.
Note now a subtle but important point. If you think carefully about this,
you will see that in virtually all cases of P-STJB liens, public records are
available of the existence of P-STJB liens or some substitute for these public
records exist. With tax, judicial and bankruptcy liens, court filings or
otherwise accessible public documents there are public records that reveal the
existence of the non-consensual liens against property. Usually these records
exist in records about the real property of debtors. Further, public paperwork
showing statutory liens usually exist. And in other statutory lien cases, the
creditors maintain possession or control of the property subject to the liens.
Said differently, “secret” liens are not much of a problem with P-STJB liens
because of the public records.
It is now extremely important to note that P-STJB liens become fully
effective as soon as the requisite steps to create them have been completed.
Thus, for example, if a judgment creditor gets a judicial lien against a debtor’s
property on January 1, that lien is fully effective on January 1. No second step
is needed to make these liens fully effective. Likewise, if the taxing authorities
get a tax lien against a debtor’s property on January 1, the tax lien is fully
effective on January 1. Again, no second step is needed. Likewise with
bankruptcy liens and possessory-statutory liens (other than agricultural liens).40
Bankruptcy and possessory-statutory liens are fully effective the date that they
are obtained. No second step is needed to complete them.


39

U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2), cmt. 4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); see also id.
§ 9-333.
40
For bankruptcy liens, see section 9-102(a)(52) of the U.C.C. For statutory liens, see section
9-333 of the U.C.C.
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Because P-STJB become fully effective as soon as they are created, the
timing (priority) date for P-STJB liens is the date of creation, or the date of
otherwise completion of the process of creating, these liens. There is, to
repeat, no second step needed.
The foregoing combination of facts brings us to an absolutely critical
idea. Because P-STJB liens are fully effective as soon as they are created and
because consensual security interests that have completed only Step 1 are NOT
yet fully effective, in terms of priority (timing), P-STJB non-consensual liens
are superior to Step 1 consensual security interests. Again, that’s because nonconsensual P-STJB liens are fully effective upon creation, but Step 1
consensual liens are NOT fully effective (because they have not yet gone
through Step 2). This means that P-STJB liens will be higher in hierarchy of
priority than Step 1 consensual liens.
One last point must be made about P-STJB non-consensual liens. Since
Article 9 puts these kinds of liens together in the same layer or tier of its
hierarchy of priority, P-STJB liens have priority against each other based on
time obtained. Thus, consistent with the general rule that earlier in time is
earlier in line, earlier in time P-STJB liens beat later in time P-STJB liens.41
D. “Step Two” Secured Creditors – Attached AND Perfected Security
Interests
As noted earlier, security interests only become fully effective following
the completion of a two-step process. Step 1, attachment, converts claims that
creditors have against the persons of debtors into claims against particular
property of the debtors. Step 2, perfection, extends the effect of the claims


41

Some supplemental timing ideas for P-STJB liens must also be mentioned:
Statutory: Timing for statutory liens differs in different jurisdictions. Usually, the time will be
the time that providers of services retain possession of the property or submit appropriate
paperwork to government officials. Important Note: In construction cases, the general rule is that
all statutory liens on the construction take effect at the time of beginning of construction. Thus,
later service providers in construction cases will have the same timing date for liens as earlier
service providers.
Tax: The time tax authorities file tax lien paperwork in the U.C.C. or real property recording
systems.
Judicial: Timing for judicial liens differs in different jurisdictions. Usually, the timing date for
judicial liens is the date when copies of judgments are filed with public records for real property
and / or in the U.C.C. filing system. In some jurisdictions, however, the timing date for judicial
liens is the time government officials physically seize the property that is subject to the judicial
liens or make symbolic gestures of seizing the property. Timing dates may also be the date of
service of process of citations to discover assets.
Bankruptcy: The time debtors file for bankruptcy.
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against property to the rest of the world.
Usually (but not always), perfection requires affirmative conduct by the
interest possessor, with that affirmative conduct usually being either the taking
possession or control of the property that is the collateral or the creation of a
public record of the security interest (by filing). In some cases, however, the
law says that security interests perfect automatically. In automatic perfection
cases, security interests perfect as soon as attachment occurs. Another “not
always” situation, but one that won’t concern us in this analysis, is perfection
by placing notification on vehicle titles.
Automatic perfection of security interests occurs in several different
situations. The best known of those situations, of course, is automatic
perfection of security interests in consumer goods. Automatic perfection also
exists, however, in a couple of Article 2 instances and in connection with
transfers of some payment rights. Further, some security interests created in
connection with securitizations also perfect automatically, as do some security
interests created in connection with loan syndications. In addition, security
interests in “indispensable paper” also perfect automatically, albeit only for a
temporary period of time.42 Finally, security interests in a “motley lot” of
different situations – using Professor White’s terminology – also perfect
automatically.
However, perfection occurs for particular security interests. Once
perfection has occurred, the subject liens are fully effective. This fact, in turn,
has important priority consequences. First, since Step 2 security interests and
P-STJB non-consensual liens are both fully effective, Article 9 treats Step 2
security interests and P-STJB non-consensual liens as equivalents in terms of
priority timing. Said differently, Article 9 puts Step 2 security interests and PSTJB non-consensual liens in the same tier or layer of the hierarchy of
priority.43 Second, since Article 9 treats Step 2 security interests and P-STJB
liens as equivalents, these kinds of security interests and liens fight it out
amongst themselves based on time obtained.44 Usually, earlier in time is
earlier in line. But this is, again, only within this tier. Both kinds of claims in
this layer or tier can beat earlier in time claims in lower layers or tiers. Third,
since Article 9 puts these kinds of claims together in the same tier, these kinds
of claims usually fight it out amongst themselves based on time obtained.45


42

U.C.C. § 9-312(e) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). Indispensable paper is
usually said to include chattel paper, instruments, documents of title and investment security
papers.
43
Id. §§ 9-317(a)(2), 9-333; 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321–6323 (2012).
44
U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
45
See generally id. § 9-322.
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Earlier in time usually means earlier in line.
A quick word must here be stated about a phenomenon that might be
called “sucked in later collateral.” In many cases, the consensual security
interests that creditors have in the property of debtors (a) describe a category
into which the collateral fits (e.g., inventory) and contains an “after-acquired
property clause” (also known as a “floating lien). In these cases, if collateral
that fits into a described category later comes into the possession of the debtor,
that later-arriving collateral is sucked into the earlier lien.46 The later arriving
collateral then gets the perfection status and timing date of the original security
interest.47 Further, security interests on collateral generally extend into
collateral that are the “proceeds” of the disposition of earlier collateral.48
When collateral goes out, proceeds comes in. In these cases, including in
bankruptcy, the security interest in the later arriving proceeds gets the
perfection status of the earlier collateral and the timing date of the original
security interest. Similar “sucked in later” rules apply to “commingled
property.49
E. “Purchase Money Interests” and the Notion of Super Priority
Purchase money security interests (“PMIs”) are interests in property that
creditors take in property to secure future payment of the money borrowed to
purchase the particular property.50 Thus, for example, if D purchases an
automobile and gives C, the car-finance company, an interest in the car to
secure payment of the loan taken out to purchase the car, the security interest is
a PMI. Likewise, of the purchaser of a house gives the finance company a
mortgage in the house to secure payment of the mortgage, the mortgage is a
PMI. On the contrary, if somebody already owns a car or a house and puts up
that car or house to secure payment of a loan taken out to do something other
than purchase the car or house, then the loan is a non-PMI. Further, if a person


46

Id. § 9-336 (a)–(c).
Id. § 9-336(d).
48
Id. § 9-315. The general rule about proceeds being sucked into earlier liens is different
when the filing for a security interest in the later-arriving collateral would generally have to be
made in a different location than the location for the filing of the original collateral. Id.
§ 9-315(d)(1). This is called the “new office” rule. There also are special rules for when the
proceeds of the disposition of collateral are “cash proceeds.” Id. § 9-315(d)–(e). In particular,
when the proceeds are cash proceeds, perfection automatically exists for 20 days. Id. However, if
filing does NOT occur in the 20 days, the perfection for the cash proceeds interests goes away. Id.
Further, perfection for cash proceeds automatically occurs only if the cash proceeds are identifiably
connected to the original collateral. Id. § 9-315.
49
Id. § 9-336(a).
50
Id. § 9-103.
47
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or business has a right to receive a payment from a debtor, and if the person or
business which has that payment right puts up that right as security for a loan
or credit purchase, then the security interest in the payment right will be a nonPMI. In Article 9, only goods and software can be the subject of PMIs.51
For complicated reasons involving “after-acquired property” clauses (aka
“floating liens”) and “category descriptions” and “proceeds” and the security
interests that can exist in connection with those things—Article 9 says that
properly perfected PMIs usually will have “super-priority.”52 Super-priority
means that later-in-time PMIs usually will beat earlier in time non-PMIs. 53
Thus, for example, if C1 has a non-PMI on some of D’s property that was
perfected on January 1, and if C2 has a PMI on the same property of D that was
perfected on May 1, C2 probably will beat C1 even though C1’s security
interest in the property is earlier in time than C2’s interest. Again, the reasons
for this are quite complicated.
It should immediately be clear that claimants who have properly
perfected PMIs54 in debtors’ property will have very high priority in that
property. Hence, PMI claimants to property usually will beat all non-PMI
creditors in connection with their claims to that property.55 Among PMI


51

Id. § 9-103(a)(1).
Id. § 9-324.
53
11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code says that Debtors in Possession (DIP) can,
under some circumstances, have priority in bankrupt debtors’ property. Commentators on the
Bankruptcy Code sometimes talk about this idea as involving “super-priority.” The super-priority
described herein – Article 9 super priority – is completely different from DIP super priority in the
Bankruptcy Code.
54
Perfection occurs in various ways for different PMIs. For example, consumer goods PMIs
perfect automatically. This is an important fact because, historically, lots and lots of consumer
goods PMIs existed. However, this isn’t a particularly important idea today because individual
buyers at the present time usually don’t buy goods on “store credit.” Rather, individual buyers
usually buy on unsecured credit with Visa, MasterCard, etc. Second, with non-inventory / non-live
stock PMIs, creditors have a 20-day “grace period” to perfect security interests in the property. If
the creditors perfect within the 20 days, the perfection becomes permanent. Otherwise, the
perfection goes away. U.C.C. § 9-324(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). Finally,
with inventory / livestock PMIs – which category problem incorporates the vast majority of PMIs –
creditors have super priority if they perfect (a) before the debtors take possession of the property
and (b) have notified other creditors of the debtors of the new PMI. Id. §§ 9-324(b), 9-324(d).
55
Not surprisingly, some complicated rules come into play in the context of super priority.
First, Article 9, specifically section 9-324(b), says that creditors who wish to take PMIs in noninventory / non-livestock collateral get super priority only if they perfect their interests—usually by
filing—within 20 days of attachment of the liens to the non-inventory/non-livestock collateral.
This 20-day grace period gives inventory / livestock PMI creditors a short, but certainly not-tooshort time frame in which to achieve perfections (and accompanying super-priority) in property.
Besides, filing itself takes essentially no time nowadays because filing in most jurisdictions can
52
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creditors, credit sellers usually will have priority over credit lenders.56
F. Rightful Possessors of Property
Recall that we started by stating the “wrongful possessors” of property
have no rights in the property at all. Hence, some people or businesses that
have property should not even be allowed to possess the property. Further, if
these persons or business can possess the property, they certainly will possess
that property subject to any consensual security interests or non-consensual
liens that exist against that property. Recall also that it was said at the outset
that wrongful possessors of property probably are relatively rare in the real
world. Rather, in many, many cases, possessors of property can be classified
as “rightful possessors” of property.
Rightful possessors of property go at the very top of our hierarchy of
priorities. Rightful possessors have the right to possess the property. Just as
importantly, however, rightful possessors of property in many cases have the
right to possess that property free of consensual security interests and nonconsensual liens that may encumber that property. Hence, in many cases,
rightful possessors of property will have priority in that property over any
interest or lien claims to the property.
Rightful possessors of property come in several distinct varieties. First,


easily be done over the Internet. Id. § 9-324(b). Second, a different methodology exists for
perfecting PMIs in inventory and livestock and for getting super priority in these instances. PMIs
in inventory / livestock are perfected (and get super-priority) only if the creditors (1) notify other
creditors of the planned PMI and (2) file financing statements about the inventory and do both of
those things before the purchasers take possession of the inventory / livestock. This process gives
earlier inventory lenders double protection. First, because of the notification requirement, new
inventory creditors of debtors must inform other inventory creditors of the debtors of the planned
PMIs and must do this before the debtors get possession of the new inventory. This notification
solves the advances problem. Second, because of the filing requirement and the fact that the filing
must occur before the purchasers take possession, earlier creditors can check the filing records
before they make advances to the debtors. The filing records will show the new PMI. Thus, again,
these special rules for perfection of inventory (and livestock) PMIs solve the advances problem.
Third, it is not uncommon for already encumbered debtors to obtain and perfect PMIs in the same
property from both a credit seller and a credit lender and to do this on the same days, or within the
same 20 day grace periods. This is, of course, totally unethical and illegal in many jurisdictions.
But, desperate people sometimes do desperate things. There is no really good solution to the
problem just described. So, the UCC just flips a coin and says the following: If credit sellers and
credit lenders both have perfected PMIs in the same property with the same priority date (or within
the same 20 day grace period), the credit sellers will beat the credit lenders. Id. § 9-324(g). Credit
lenders, the UCC says (sort of randomly), are better able to take the loss in these rare cases than
credit sellers.
56
Id. § 9-324(g) cmt. 13.
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in many cases, creditors who have consensual security interests in some of the
property of debtors authorize the debtors to dispose of the property. This is
particularly so if the property that is the subject of the security interest is
inventory to the debtors. If debtors then dispose of this property—which,
again, the debtors do with permission of the creditors—the third parties to take
the possession of the property do so free of the interests in it.57 Second, in two
instances, Article 2 of the UCC says that a buyer or seller who has possession
of property has the highest priority in that property.58 These two instances,
which are principally designed to defeat claims brought by bankruptcy trustees
of a buyer or seller, involve shipments of property under reservation and
rightful rejections or revocations of acceptance of the property by the nonbankrupt buyer or seller. Third, Article 9 says that possessors of property who
have perfected security interests by “control of” the property have priority, in
some cases, over claimants who have perfected security interests in the
property by methods other than control.59
Fourth, in some cases that sound obscure but cover many real world
cases, buyers of goods—these are not “buyers in the ordinary course of
business” (who we will get to in a moment) but just “buyers” of such
goods60—take the goods free of security interests that creditors get in the goods
if the security interests arise in connection with “advances” that the creditors
make on earlier loans.61 Buyers will take the property free of these advances
interests if the creditors get the interests after they learn that the buyers bought
the goods or, more importantly, if the creditors take the interests more than
forty-five days after the buyers buy the goods.62 A similar advances rule exists
for leased goods.63 To repeat, the buyers or lessees here are not “buyers in the
ordinary course of business”.
Collectively, the most important examples of rightful possessors of


57

Id. § 9-315(a). In these cases, the creditors usually get security interests in the “proceeds”
of the disposition of the property, with proceeds often being money or other forms of payment.
The security interests in the proceeds then take the place of the interests in the property itself.
58
U.C.C. §§ 2-505, 2-711 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
59
Id. § 9-328 (2010); see also id. §§ 9-312, 9-104, 9-107, 9-312(b) to 9-314.
60
Id. § 9-320(a). In this analysis, buyers in the ordinary course of business here are classified
as “good faith possessors” of property. We will come to these kinds of possessors of property in a
moment.
61
Generally speaking, creditors who make “advances” on earlier loans automatically get
security interests in property that debtors bought. These advances interests generally have the
perfection status and timing dates of the original interests. Creditors who make advances such as
in the present case are an exception to that general rule.
62
U.C.C. § 9-323(d)–(e) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
63
Id. § 9-323(f).



172

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. IX:I

property can be called “good faith possessors” of the property. Under Article
9, and other sources of law, these good faith possessors have been given
extraordinary rights in the property. In most cases, good faith possessors of
property have the highest claim to a property. Furthermore, these possessors of
property generally take the property free of existing security interests in it.
Examples of “good faith possessors” of property, i.e. possessors of property
who have the highest priority in the property, are:
(1) Good Faith Purchasers of Goods; 64
(2) Buyers in the Ordinary Course of Business;65
(3) Holders of Article 7 Documents of Title (Bills of Lading and
Warehouse Receipts);66
(4) Holders in Due Course of Article 3 Payment Instruments;67
(5) Assignees of Accounts Where Underlying Contracts Include Waivers
of Defenses;68
(6) Consumer Buyers from Consumer Sellers (The Garage Sale Rule);69
(7) Some Possessors of Some Kinds of Chattel Paper. 70


64

Id. § 2-403 (2002).
Id. § 9-320(a) (2010); see also id. §§ 2-201(9), 2-403 (2002).
66
Id. § 2-201(21) (2002); see also id. § 7-502 (2003).
67
Id. § 3-302 (2002); see also id. § 9-316 (2010).
68
Id. § 9-403 (2010).
69
Id. § 9-320(b).
70
Id. § 9-330. The UCC says that there are two different kinds of chattel paper. First, in a
very large number of cases, retailers who purchase inventory from wholesalers or manufacturers
give the wholesalers or manufacturers of that inventory interests in the inventory that they
purchase. The wholesalers and manufacturers in these cases also take “proceeds” interest from the
retailers’ disposition of the inventory. (Proceeds are the product of the disposition of other
collateral.) Later, the retailers sell this inventory to third parties (customers) and in exchange for
the inventory get chattel paper from the third parties. The chattel paper in these cases is “merely
[the] proceeds” of the retailers’ disposition of the inventory collateral. Since the original creditors
have proceeds interests in this chattel paper, the original creditors claim this paper. The UCC
Permanent Editorial Board calls this “Type A” chattel paper, or “merely proceeds” chattel paper.
Second, in some rare cases, original creditors take interests in chattel paper that is not merely the
proceeds of the disposition of inventory. Rather, in these cases, the chattel paper in which the
65
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Quick analysis reveals that it is remarkably easy to qualify as a good
faith possessor of property. Indeed, only three elements are necessary to so
qualify. First, the transferees must give value for the property or rights they
receive.71 So, gift transferees cannot have the status of good faith possessor of
property. Second, the transferees must act in good faith regarding the
transfers.72 Good faith in this context means that the transferees have used
their industry’s normal business practices. Lastly, the transferees cannot have
knowledge of the problems with the property or rights that they are taking by


original creditors take interests has value independent of the debtors’ sales of inventory. The UCC
Permanent Editorial Board calls this “Type B” chattel paper or “other than merely proceeds”
chattel paper; it is hard to come up with even a single example.
In connection with both Type A and Type B chattel paper, the chattel paper creditors
sometimes later transfer the chattel paper to second financers, usually in exchange for immediate
cash. These second financers then also take interests in the chattel paper. In these cases,
conflicting claims to the paper can arise: The original creditors can claim the paper either as
proceeds of the disposition of inventory collateral (Type A chattel paper) or as original collateral
(Type B chattel paper). But, the second financers also claim the paper because of their interests in
it.
Lots of confusion exists among lawyers, commentators, and judges about the impact of the
foregoing, and even if the foregoing is an accurate statement of the law. However, White and
Summers give us what perhaps is the best explanation for what is going on here generally, and why
the difference between Type A and Type B matters. First, with both Type A paper (merely
proceeds) and with Type B paper (other than merely proceeds), original creditors who have claims
against the chattel paper can defeat claims against it by second financers simply by stamping a
“legend” on the face of the paper. A legend states that that paper is subject to the original
creditors’ security interest. In effect, this stamp or legend makes it impossible for the second
financers to assert that they do not have knowledge of the original creditors’ interests in the paper.
The paper itself describes the original interests. Second, if the chattel paper is not stamped
or legended, then the paper will be treated differently depending on whether it is Type A or Type
B. With unstamped Type A chattel paper, the second financers will have priority over the original
creditor even if the second financer knew—from a source other than the paper itself (often a
publicly recorded financing statement)—that somebody else already has a security interest in the
paper. The second financer, in this situation, is a good faith possessor of the chattel paper property.
However, with unstamped Type B chattel paper, the second financer will have priority in the paper
only if the second financer was unaware that the paper was subject to an already-existing security
interest in it. The bottom Line is if original creditors stamp or legend chattel paper in which they
claim a security interest, the original creditors will have priority in that paper over second financers
whether the paper is Type A or Type B paper. However, if original creditors do not stamp or
legend chattel paper, then different rules apply to Type A and Type B chattel paper. Type A paper
(knowledge by second financers from sources other than the paper itself of the earlier interest in the
paper does not defeat the second financers’ claims) provides less protection to original creditors
than Type B.
71
See generally U.C.C. §§ 9-317 to 9-339.
72
Id.
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transfer.73 This does not mean that there are no problems, it just means that the
transferees do not know about the problems.
It will be easy, in many cases, for transferees of property to show all
three of these elements. So, in many cases, transferees of property or rights
will qualify as good faith possessors of property and will have the highest
priority in particular property.74 This highest priority means, among other
things, that these claimants will take the property free of third party security
interests and liens.
II. THE HIERARCHY OF ARTICLE 9 PRIORITY:
A GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION
As noted at the outset, it is possible to put together a list of seven
different kinds of claimants (or different kinds of interests) to particular
property of debtors. Claimants early on this list—claimants graphically at the
bottom of our chart of hierarchy—have low priority in the property. If debtors
have limited amounts of property, these low-priority claimants usually will get
little or nothing. Conversely, claimants late on this list—claimants who are
high on the chart of priority—usually will recover at least something.
Claimants within the individual tiers or layers of this hierarchy of priorities
usually will fight it out amongst themselves using the earlier-in-time (earlierin-line) general rule.


73
74



Id.
Id.
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TABLE 1: The Hierarchy of Article 9 Priorities
“RIGHTFUL POSSESSORS” OF PROPERTY
Rightful possessors of property include possessors of property who are the beneficiaries of
authorized disposition of collateral, two instances of Article 2 possession (2-505, 2-711), plain
vanilla buyers of goods, in some cases involving “advances” on earlier loans, and possessors of
property who have perfected interests in property by possession or control of that property (rather
than through other methods of perfection). Most importantly, rightful possessors include
possessors who can be called “good faith possessors” of the property. This category includes: (1)
Good Faith Purchasers of Goods; (2) Buyers in the Ordinary Course of Business; (3) Holders of
Article 7 Documents of Title (Bills of Lading and Warehouse Receipts); (4) Holders in Due
Course of Article 3 Payment Instruments; (5) Assignees of Accounts Where Underlying Contracts
Include Waivers of Defenses; (6) Consumer Buyers from Consumer Sellers (The Garage Sale
Rule); and (7) Some Possessors of Some Kinds of Chattel Paper.
In several important contexts, property that is not in the possession of debtors at the time of initial
security interests, but that later comes into the possession of debtors, can be sucked into the initial
(and earlier-in-time) security interests. This usually happens in connection with after-acquired
property (AAP) clauses, clauses that run alongside category descriptions of collateral. “Proceeds”
also are sucked into earlier interests. With comingled property, the interests share pro rata.
Outside of bankruptcy, interests in AAP that are in category descriptions get the perfection status
and time of the initial interests.
In bankruptcy, interests on proceeds get the perfection times of the initial interests. In other
instances of sucked-in-later collateral and bankruptcy, however, and leaving aside comingled
property, the timing dates for the interests in the later-arriving collateral is the later time of the
debtors’ possession of the property rather than the earlier time of the initial interests. With
comingled property, the competing interests share pro rata.
Article 9 also has some specialized priority rules not described on this chart, rules involving, for
example, “local law” (U.C.C. § 9-301 et seq.) and specialized financing methods (U.C.C. § 9-326
et seq.)
PERFECTED PMIS
Perfected purchase money interests (PMIs) get super-priority. This means that later-in-time PMIs
can beat earlier-in-time non-PMIs and P-STJB liens.
Reminder: PMIs are NOT a rare exception in terms of security interests. Rather, many perfected
security interests—probably even a large majority—are PMIs. So, many perfected security
interests go in this PMI level rather than the level below, non-PMIs and P-STJB liens.
The Process for Getting PMIs
Except in connection with inventory and livestock, PMI holders get super-priority if they file
within twenty days of attachment of the interests to the property. This idea exists mostly to protect
later potential credit sellers or lenders from earlier-in-time AAP clauses and proceeds interests.
With inventory and livestock, PMI holders get super-priority if they file and notify other interest
creditors before taking possession of the property. This rule exists mostly to protect earlier-in-time
inventory lenders.
In rare cases where competing PMIs exist in the same property, PMI credit sellers generally beat
PMI credit lenders.
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ATTACHED AND PERFECTED NON-PMIS AND P-STJB LIENS
Perfected Non-PMIs and Possessory-Statutory, Tax, Judicial and Bankruptcy liens (P-STJB) beat
Step 1 consensual liens and general claims. PMIs do NOT go here.
Perfected Non-PMIs and P-STJB liens compete with each other on an equal basis. Earlier-in-time
liens in this level beat later-in-time liens in this level. Again, PMIs do not go here.
Reminder: Many perfected consensual interests—perhaps most perfected consensual interests in
percentage numbers—are PMIs. So, many (and perhaps most) perfected consensual interests do
not go in this level. Rather, many perfected consensual interests go in the next higher level.
Timing for Non-PMIs and P-STJB Liens
Non-PMIs: The timing date for Non-PMIs is the date of perfection of the Non-PMIs.
Statutory Liens: Timing for statutory liens differs in different jurisdictions. Usually, the time will
be the time providers of services retain possession of the property or submit appropriate paperwork
to government officials. Important Note: In construction cases, the general rule is that all
statutory liens on the construction take effect at the time of beginning of construction. Thus, later
service providers in construction cases will have the same timing date for liens as earlier service
providers.
Tax Liens: The time tax authorities file tax lien paperwork in the U.C.C. or real property recording
systems.
Judicial Liens: Timing for judicial liens differs in different jurisdictions. Usually, the timing date
for judicial liens is the date when copies of judgments are filed with public records for real
property or in the U.C.C. filing system. In some jurisdictions, however, the timing date for
judicial liens is the time government officials physically seize the property that is subject to the
judicial liens or make symbolic gestures of seizing the property. Another useful timing date may
be the date of service of process of citations to discover assets.
Bankruptcy Liens (bankruptcy trustee has “status of a lien creditor”): The time debtors file for
bankruptcy.
ATTACHED BUT NOT PERFECTED SECURITY INTERESTS
Step 1 security interests—attached but not perfected—beat general claimants because these are
claims against specific property rather than just claims against the persons of debtors. However,
Step 1 security interests—attached but not perfected—lose to perfected security interests and to
non-consensual STJB liens. Bankruptcy liens—the “status of” a lien creditor—pulls all the
general creditors, collectively, into this level of the hierarchy.
GENERAL CLAIMANTS
General claimants against debtors—also known as unsecured claimants—beat wrongful possessors
of the property. Among general claimants, those earlier-in-time beat those later-in-time.
Important Note: When debtors file for bankruptcy, debtors’ bankruptcy trustees become
representatives for all of the debtors’ general creditors. The bankruptcy trustees then get the
“status of” lien creditors. Thus, the bankruptcy trustees, who, to repeat, represent all the general
creditors collectively, move into the next higher hierarchy level.
WRONGFUL POSSESSORS OF PROPERTY
Wrongful possessors of property (including, most importantly, “innocent converters” of property)
have no right to the subject property at all. Thus, wrongful possessors lose to everybody. They
may not be able to possess the property generally. Further, if they can possess it, they will take it
subject to its interests in it. Note: Innocent converters might have claims against their transferees
for the wrongful transfers.
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CONCLUSION
Because “priorities” in claims encompass such an important issue in
connection with debtors and creditors, many commentators spend lots of time
discussing priorities. Unfortunately, however, most of these discussions use
what might be called an individualized or seriatim approach to priorities. The
commentators start out by describing the priorities for an individual kind of
property or an individual kind of transaction. Then the commentators move on
to a second kind of property or transaction and talk about the priority rules for
those cases. After finishing the discussion of priorities for this second kind of
property or transaction, the commentators move on to a third kind of property
or transaction, and then on to a fourth, etc. Hardly any commentators, it seems,
attempt to show how different priority ideas fit together with each other, or
where different kinds of priorities have related but different impacts on
individual debtors or creditors. Discussions of priorities, for example, rarely (if
ever) show how creditors with “attached but not perfected” security interests
stand in relation to other kinds of creditors. Likewise, discussions of priorities
rarely (if ever) show how various liens—for example, possessory-statutory,
tax, bankruptcy, and judicial liens—fit into an overall scheme of priority.
Rather, most discussions of priorities simply state what the priority is for
certain kinds of claims and state nothing further. No overall scheme is
described.
The above analysis addressed this problem by suggesting that there is an
overall “hierarchy of priorities” articulated in Article 9 of the UCC, a hierarchy
that consists of seven distinct layers or tiers. Creditors who are in layers or
tiers at or near the bottom of this hierarchy have very low priority. They,
likely, will get little or nothing from debtors if the debtors have limited assets.
Conversely, creditors who are in tiers or layers at or near the top of this
hierarchy have high priority. These creditors will likely get at least something
from debtors when different creditors assert claims against the debtors. Within
the different tiers or layers in the hierarchy, creditors usually fight it out
amongst themselves using the earlier-in-time or earlier-in-line rule.





